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FEATURED ARTICLE

"The Entrails of a Goat":
Reflections on Reading Lea
Brilmayer's Hague Lectures
by Herma Hill Kay*
I.

INTRODUCTION

No one will be surprised to hear that my former student, Professor Lea
Brilmayer, and I have a long-standing disagreement about the merits of
the approach to choice of law theory proposed by my former teacher,
Professor Brainerd Currie. I take Currie's interest analysis to be a
major intellectual achievement, a paradigm-shattering advance over the
traditional vested rights theory advocated by the father of the First
Restatement, Professor Joseph Beale, and a sound basis for further
theorizing in choice of law. Brilmayer regards interest analysis as a
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"house without foundations"' that was built on the "myth" of legislative
intent;2 rejects its teachings as "methodologically bankrupt"3 and
"metaphysical as Beale";4 and denounces its claim to identify governmental interests after having examined the policy underlying a state
statute as providing "no more guarantee of authenticity than the fact
that an announcement that the gods want human sacrifices takes place
after examining the entrails of a goat."5
I do not propose to revisit here my disagreement with Brilmayer over
Currie's theory. I have defended his approach against several critics,
including Brilmayer, elsewhere.' Rather, I wish to elaborate on two of
my own clarifications of Currie's approach in light of Brilmayer's
discussion of my work in her recent Hague Lectures.7 This volume in
honor of Currie, which revisits his approach, seems a convenient
occasion for me to offer a reply to Brilmayer on two points: (1) whether
governmental interests, as Currie used that term, can be created by
legislative enactment, or whether instead, interests arise from the
objective confluence of the law-fact pattern of a given case; and (2) the
relevance to a court using interest analysis of the existence of jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rules in another state whose domestic law is
potentially applicable. Brilmayer uses my analysis of both points as
fresh support for her claim that interest analysis eschews actual
legislative intent in favor of choice of law logic that chooses connecting
factors to establish the spacial applicability of conflicting laws just as the
traditionalists did. As she puts it, "the interests that the modern
theorists purport to identify bear only the most casual And coincidental
resemblance to what the legislature happens to want."' I believe her
claim can be shown to be overstated. Adopting the method used ' by the
panel in the conversations reported in this volume, I will focus on a

1. Lea Brilmayer. Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations,46
OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985).
2. Lea Brilmayer, InterestAnalysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV.
392 (1980).
3. Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35

MERCER L. REV. 555 (1984).
4. Id. at 563.
5. Lea Brilmayer, The Role of Substantive and Choice of Law Policies in the Formation
and Application of Choice of Law Rules, 252 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 92 n.93 (1995).
6. Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie'sGovernmental InterestAnalysis, 215 RECUEIL
DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1989-111).

7.
8.

Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 84-89.
Id. at 107-08.
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familiar case, Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.,

for purposes of this

discussion.
II.

THE PFAU CASE

Pfau involved an automobile collision in Iowa between two vehicles,
one driven by a New Jersey student attending Parsons College in Iowa
who was en route to Missouri for the weekend with a college classmate
from Connecticut, the other operated by an Iowa resident driving with
his family. The collision resulted from the negligence of the New Jersey
driver and caused injuries to the Iowa family as well as the Connecticut
passenger. The vehicle driven by the New Jersey student was owned by
his father's New Jersey corporation, registered in New Jersey, and
insured by a New Jersey insurance company. The insurer settled the
claims of the Iowa family, but denied that of the Connecticut passenger,
who thereafter brought suit in New Jersey against the host and the
owner of the vehicle, relying on the New Jersey law that required a host
to use at.least ordinary care for the safety of a guest. The defendants
invoked the Iowa guest statute as a defense. That statute provided that
a host-driver is not liable to his guest-passenger for ordinary negligence."0 The trial court struck this defense, holding New Jersey law
The appellate division reversed and reinstated the
applicable. 1
defense.' 2 On appeal from the interlocutory order dismissing plaintiff's
claim, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the order of the
appellate division and reinstated the order13 of the trial court striking the
defense based on the Iowa guest statute.
Justice Proctor began his analysis for the New Jersey Supreme Court
by noting that the court had previously rejected the lex loci delicti rule
for determining choice of law in torts cases and had adopted the
governmental interest analysis approach.' 4 True to the methodology
of interest analysis, Justice Proctor began by examining the policies
underlying the law asserted by one of the parties to displace forum law
as the rule of decision: he examined the purposes of the Iowa guest
statute "as articulated by the Iowa courts." 5 That examination

9.

263 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1970).

10. Id. at 130.
11. Id.
12. Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 255 A.2d 792, 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969)
(invoking the "grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity" approach to choice of law), rev'd,
263 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1970).
13. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 137.
14. Id. at 130-31 (citing Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1967)).
15. Id at 131.
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produced a list of purposes, 16 none of which appeared to the New Jersey
court "to be relevant to the present matter"' 7 because "[tihe desire of
Iowa to prevent collusive suits and suits by ungrateful guests and to cut
down litigation would ordinarily apply to Iowa domiciliaries, defendants
insuring motor vehicles [there], and persons suing in its courts.""8
Having examined the legislative purposes (or using Currie's term, the
policies) that Iowa courts had identified underlying the guest statute,
and having determined that, given the facts of the case before him, none
of those purposes would be achieved by applying the statute, Justice
Proctor drew the 'following conclusion:
It is clear to us that Iowa has no interest in this suit. Recovery for
negligence in this action will not transgress any of the purposes behind
Iowa's guest statute as enunciated by that state's courts or legislature,
and will not in the slightest impair traffic safety in Iowa .... We are
convinced that if the plaintiff were a New Jersey domiciliary Iowa's
guest statute Would be inapplicable."8
The final sentence of the quoted paragraph reflects two conclusions
about New Jersey law, both spelled out later in the opinion: First, as to
its domestic law, "that the strong policy of this state is to allow a guestpassenger to be compensated by his host-driver in cases of ordinary
negligence," 0 and second, that in a case where both guest and host
were domicilliaries of New Jersey, the state would have an interest in
implementing its policy of compensation.

16. Id.
These purposes are: "to cut down litigation arising from the commendable
unselfish practice of sharing with others transportation in one's vehicle and
protect the Good Samaritan from claims based on negligence by those invited to

ride as a courtesy," Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 118 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1962); to
prevent ingratitude by guests, Knutson v. Lurie, 251 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 1933);
to prevent suits by hitchhikers, Id.; "to prevent collusion suits by friends and
relatives resulting in excessively high insurance rates," Hardwick v. Bublitz, 111
N.W.2d 309, 312 (Iowa 1961).
Id. (parallel citations omitted).

17. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 131-32.
This action will not increase litigation in the Iowa courts; no hitchhiker is
involved; no Iowa insurer will be subjected to a "collusive suit" since the insurer
is a New Jersey corporation; there is no "Good Samaritan" Iowa host-driver to be

protected; and finally, there is no Iowa guest displaying his 'ingratitude' by suing
for ordinary negligence.

Id.
18. Id. at 132.
19. Id. at 135.
20. Id.
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In Pfau, however, plaintiff was not a domiciliary of New Jersey, but
rather of Connecticut. Justice Proctor considered whether this fact
sufficiently altered the law-fact pattern to change his conclusion that
Iowa law was inapplicable. 21 To do so, he examined Connecticut
law.22 He found that Connecticut had repealed its guest statute in
1931, and since that time had permitted guest-passengers to recover
from their host-drivers for ordinary negligence. 2 Thus, looking only at
its domestic law, Justice Proctor concluded that "if this plaintiff-guest
had been injured in a Connecticut accident by a Connecticut host-driver,
there would be no bar to recover for ordinary negligence if suit were
brought in that state."2 4
This analysis suggests that plaintiff could recover in New Jersey
under Connecticut law. Although it is not entirely clear from the record,
the appellate court opinion suggests that plaintiff did not rely on
Connecticut law; instead, he had invoked the law of the forum-New
Jersey.25 Under those circumstances, what interest, if any, did New
Jersey have in applying its law?
At this point in his opinion, Justice Proctor turned for guidance to
another state court that had adopted governmental interest analysis-the opinion in Reich v. Purcell,2s written for a unanimous California Supreme Court by its distinguished Chief Justice, Roger J. Traynor.
Like Pfau, Reich involved an automobile collision in one state (Missouri),
a negligent driver from a second state (California), and a plaintiff from
a third state (Ohio), in which only the state of injury imposed a
limitation on recovery. 27 Reich differed from Pfau in that plaintiff's
suit was for the wrongful death of his wife and child, and the statute
relied upon by the negligent driver was a limitation on damages for
wrongful death rather than a statute barring a guest's recovery from a
host for ordinary negligence."8 In both cases, however, the sole issue

21.

1d.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 255 A.2d 792, 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969),
reu'd, 263 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1970). "The precise question presented is whether.... the law
of Iowa which precludes an action, based upon ordinary negligence, by a guest in an
automobile against his host, applies, or whether the law of New Jersey, which permits such
a recovery, is applicable." Id.
26. 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967).
27. Id. at 728-29.
28. Another factual difference between the two cases was that plaintiffs decedent, at
the time of the collision in Missouri, had been en route to California where she and her
family were thinking of relocating. By the time suit was filed in California, plaintiff and
his surviving son had settled in California. This factual difference, and Chief Justice
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before the court was whether the defense based on the statute in force
at the place of the injury applied to prevent (in Pfau), or to limit (in
Reich), plaintiff's recovery.
Chief Justice Traynor's approach to determining the respective policies
of the three states was similar to that used by Justice Proctor. He
turned first to an analysis of the Missouri statute limiting damages for
wrongful death to twenty-five thousand dollars. Although he did not
cite Missouri cases as authority for his analysis, as Justice Proctor had
done in approaching the Iowa statute, Traynor drew on well-recognized
characteristics of such limitation statutes." He identified two such
purposes: to determine "how survivors should be compensated"3 0 and
"to avoid the imposition of excessive financial burdens on [defendants]. " ' Considering those policies in light of the law-fact pattern of
the case, Chief Justice Traynor, like Justice Proctor, found that they
would not be advanced by their application to the nonresident parties in
a lawsuit brought outside Missouri.32 As to the first purpose, Missouri,
as the place of wrong, "has little or no interest in such compensation
when none of the parties reside there."3 3 As to the second, "[tihat
concern is also primarily local arid we fail to perceive any substantial
interest Missouri might have in extending the benefits of its limitation
of damages to travelers from states having no similar limitation.""'
Having eliminated Missouri as an interested state, Chief Justice
Traynor had been confronted, as Justice Proctor was, with the question
of whether the forum, as the domicilliary state of the defendant driver,
had an interest in applying its own law to allow full 'recovery. Here
Chief Justice Traynor was presented with an argument that Justice
Proctor did not have to resolve: whether plaintiffs' change of domicile
from Ohio to California between the time of the occurrence and the time
suit was filed brought them within the ambit of California's policy of full

Traynor's treatment of it, will be considered later. See infra text at notes 36-38.
29. Reich, 432 P.2d at 730-31. Professor David Currie observed that the California

court's analysis of the policies underlying the wrongful death laws and their damage
limitations "is a standard one, so much so as to raise a danger signal. For no Ohio or
Missouri materials are cited in explanation of these policies .... " David P. Currie,
Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 595, 598 n.20 (1968). Justice Proctor's
analysis is not subject to a similar criticism.
30. Reich, 432 P.2d at 731.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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compensation.35 Traynor's answer to this question was clear, yet
controversial.3 6 He wrote:
Although plaintiffs now reside in California, their residence and
domicile at the time of the accident are the relevant residence and
domicile. At the time of the accident the plans to change the family
domicile were not definite and fixed, and if the choice of law were made
to turn on events happening after the accident, forum shopping would
be encouraged. (See Cavers, [The Choice of Law Process (1965)], p. 151,
fn.16.) Accordingly, plaintiffs' present domicile in California does not
give this state any interest in applying its law, and since California has
no limitation of damages, it also has no interest in applying its law on
behalf of defendant. As a forum that is therefore disinterested in the
only issue in dispute, we must decide whether to adopt the Ohio or the
Missouri rule as the rule of decision for this case. 7
Chief Justice Traynor went on to hold that Ohio law applied to provide
unlimited damages to plaintiffs," thus treating the case, in Currie's
terminology, as a false conflict in a disinterested third state.
Justice Proctor reported this analysis accurately, but he was not
disposed to follow it in Pfau by declaring New Jersey a disinterested
forum.39 Because of its importance to the question of how interests are
identified by a court following Currie's approach, it is worth quoting
Proctor's reasoning in full. He wrote:
It may well be that in this case, however, New Jersey has an
interest. We are not certain that a defendant's domicile lacks an
interest in seeing that its domiciliaries are held to the full measure of

35. Id. at 730.
36. Of the twelve choice of law scholars who joined in a symposium commenting on the
case, only two-Professor David Cavers and myself-agreed with Chief Justice Traynor's
statement that California was a disinterested state. See David F. Cavers, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 647, 647 n.1 (1968); Herma Hill Kay, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 584, 589-90, 594 (1968).
37. Reich, 432 P.2d at 730.
38. Id. at 731.
Defendant's liability should not be limited when no party to the action is from a
state limiting liability and when defendant, therefore, would have secured
insurance, if any, without any such limit in mind. A defendant cannot reasonably
complain when compensatory damages are assessed in accordance with the law
of his domicile and plaintiffs receive no more than they would had they been
injured at home. (See Cavers, (The Choice of Law Process (1965)], supra, pp. 153157.) Under these circumstances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full
recovery to injured parties does not conflict with any substantial interest of
Missouri.
Id.

39. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 137.

898

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

damages or the standard of care which the state's laws provide for. A
state should not only be concerned with the protection and self-interest
of its citizens. See Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d [394] at 399 [1969]. In
Cohen v.Kaminetsky, ... [176 A.2d 483 (1961)], we emphasized a
host's duty to his guests. There we said: "We see no reason why the
host should be less vigilant for his own guest than he must be for the
guest in another car. The duty to exercise reasonable care is as
appropriate in the one situation as in the other." 176 A.2d at 487. It
would not seem just to limit the imposition of this duty to instances
where a New Jersey host negligently injures a New Jersey guest in a
state which has a guest statute. See Mellk v. Sarahson .... [229 A.2d
625 (1967)]. Therefore, if Connecticut had a guest statute in this case,
we would be forced to choose between our state's policy of holding our
hosts to a duty of ordinary care and Connecticut's policy of denying a
guest recovery for the ordinary negligence of his host and we might
have a true conflict. But since Connecticut has the same policy of
applying principles of ordinary negligence to the host-guest relationship as does New Jersey, this case presents a false conflict and it is
unnecessary for us to decide whether this state has an interest
sufficient to warrant application of its law. See Leflar, American
Conflicts Law at 328-29.4o
In Justice Proctor's view, Pfau presented the equivalent of a common
domicile case in which a New Jersey resident had injured another New
Jersey resident in Iowa. 41 His dictum concerning New Jersey's possible
interest in imposing a duty of care on New Jersey hosts for the benefit
of their guests, regardless of the domicile of the guest or the place of
injury, has been followed by at least one other court.42
III.

THE OBJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION OF INTERESTS

Brilmayer has challenged my clarification of Currie's method of
identifying interests, noting that I argue "that while the determination
of policies is responsive to legislative wishes, the determination of
interests is not."4 1 She goes on to quote in full a passage in which I
observe that "although the state can create its governmental policy

40. Id. at 136 (emphasis in original) (parallel citations omitted).
41. Id. at 137.
42. Labree v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 817, 818 (R.I. 1973) (holding a Rhode Island host>
driver who injured a Massachusetts guest-passenger liable despite a Massachusetts guest
statute because "[a] Rhode Island driver has the same duty of care towards a Massachusetts passenger whether he is driving in Rhode Island or Massachusetts," and citing Pfau
in support of this conclusion).
43. Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 85.
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through its legislatures, its executive, or its courts, it cannot create a
governmental interest through its own actions."4 4 She then observes:
[11f one thing follows from the just-quoted passage, it is that States

cannot create interests simply by declaring or wishing them into
existence. It is hard to believe that the interest analysts are really
finding the answers in the statute when the statute's authors have no
control over the answers that the interest analysis uncovers. They are
definitely finding something in the statute that the legislature did not
put there.4"
I propose to test the validity of this critique against the methodology
used by Justice Proctor and Chief Justice Traynor, in identifying the
interests of their respective states in Pfau and Reich.
Both Pfau and Reich were cases in which an out-of-state plaintiff
sought recovery from a local defendant for injuries resulting from the
defendant's negligence in a third state. In both cases, the forum's tort
law provided for full recovery, but the law of the place of injury
prevented (Pfau) or limited (Reich) plaintiff's recovery. If the forum's
legislative policy of allowing full recovery is understood to be designed
to make injured persons whole, such a policy will be fu-thered whenever
the law is applied to permit recovery by a person who is within the
group of local residents over whom the legislative power extends and for
whom the policy was designed. If, however, the plaintiff is not within
that group, then application of forum law to hold a local defendant liable
will not advance the domestic legislative policy. Both Justice Proctor
and Chief Justice Traynor demonstrated familiarity in their respective
opinions with this line of analysis.4 s Yet Chief Justice Traynor decided
that California had no interest in applying its law, while Justice Proctor
determined that New Jersey did have such an interest. Did the two
jurists differ in the way they identified state interests in these cases?

44. Id.
45. Id. at 86.
46. This method of statutory interpretation is not unique to choice of law. Indeed,
Justice Proctor used it in Pfau to rule out as irrelevant Iowa's policy of preventing recovery
by hitchhikers against their hosts: because plaintiff was not a hitchhiker, he reasoned,
application of the Iowa guest statute to plaintiff would not achieve that legislative purpose.
See supra note 17. Similarly, application of the Iowa guest statute to a New Jersey
defendant would not achieve the legislative policy of protecting Iowa hosts against claims
from ungrateful guests. Whether constitutional principles of equal protection or privileges
and immunities require Iowa to extend the benefit of its guest statute defense to
nonresident hosts who have injured nonresident passengers in Iowa is a question that
Brainerd Currie and I have explored elsewhere. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 445-525 (Privileges and Immunities), 526.83 (Equal Protection)
(1963); Kay, supra note 6, at 145-49.
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Though that might appear to be so, a more careful analysis indicates
that the difference lies in the interpretation each judge gave to his
state's domestic policy, not in the way each articulated the state's
interests.
Chief Justice Traynor implicitly viewed the policy underlying
California's law of unlimited liability for wrongful death as designed to
make plaintiffs whole, and because plaintiff was not a Californian at the
time of the accident, he concluded that California had no interest in
applying its law for the benefit of an Ohio plaintiff.47 Justice Proctor,
however, did not interpret New Jersey law as designed only to provide
recovery for New Jersey plaintiffs. Rather, he noted that the New
Jersey court in a prior case48 had "emphasized a host's duty to his
guests."4 9 Justice Proctor evidently inferred from this emphasis that
New Jersey's law permitting unlimited recovery to guests had two
purposes: to benefit guests by making them whole and to regulate the
conduct of hosts by imposing on them a duty of ordinary care. The New
Jersey policy, thus defined, would be furthered by its application either
to permit recovery by a New Jersey guest, or to enforce an obligation of
care against a New Jersey host.
Justice Proctor's reliance on the New Jersey defendant's domicile as
the basis for suggesting that New Jersey might have an interest in
applying its law flowed directly from his interpretation of New Jersey's
domestic policy. Chief Justice Traynor's rejection of the California
defendant's domicile as leading to the recognition of a California interest
stemmed from his interpretation of California's domestic policy. Given
Justice Proctor's view of New Jersey law, its policy would be furthered
by its application to a New Jersey defendant, although Chief Justice
Traynor's view of California law meant that its policy would not be
furthered by its application to a California defendant.
In both Pfau and Reich, the first analytical task for a judge following
Currie's approach is to identify the policy underlying the laws invoked
by the parties. The policy is expressed, either implicitly or explicitly, in

47. Reich, 432 P.2d at 730.
48. Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 176 A.2d 483 (N.J. 1961). Cohen did not present a conflict
of laws problem. Both host and guest were residents of New Jersey and the injury
occurred in that state. The issue was whether a host owed the same duty of care to a
passenger, regardless of whether the host had invited the passenger along or whether the
passenger or someone on his behalf had asked for the ride. The court held that the host
owed both sets of passengers "a duty to exercise reasonable care." Id. at 487. In the course
of its opinion, the court rejected the "ungrateful guest" rationale for limitations on a guest's
recovery. Id.
49. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 136 (emphasis in original) (citing Cohen, 176 A.2d at 487).
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the domestic law.5" Once the policy has been identified, the next
analytic task is to determine whether the policy will be advanced by its
application to the facts of the particular case. That inquiry focuses on
whether the fact pattern engages the policy so as to achieve the
underlying purposes of the law. It is the objective confluence of policy
and fact that produces the interest. Without Justice Proctor's determination that the New Jersey policy was one of creating a duty of care for
hosts, the fact of defendant's domicile would have been as irrelevant in
Pfau as Chief Justice Traynor found it to be in Reich. Conversely, Chief
Justice Traynor's determination that the California policy was limited
to providing full recovery meant that defendant's domicile did not trigger
its application. In both cases, the legislature had declared the state law,
the court had interpreted that law to discover its underlying policy, and
then had identified the state's interest in achieving that policy by
reference to the unique factual circumstances.
Brilmayer, however, offers another critique of my position that
legislatures do not create interests, as that term is used in interest
analysis. Citing part of a passage in which she claims Currie supports
"certain sorts of legislative choice of law pronouncements,"5 she argues
that his invitation to legislatures to "cultivate the practice of adding to
specific enactments a section specifying the extent to which the law is
intended to apply to cases involving foreign factors"5 2 means that,

50. Brilmayer's repeated charge that interest analysts "are making their own decision
and not finding in a statute something that the legislature put into it," Brilmayer, supra
note 5, at 108, apparently is directed at the identification of interests, not the determination of policies.
51. Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 86 (quoting B. Currie, supra note 46, at 171). Here is
the passage as she quotes it:
There is a contribution that legislatures can make to progress in this troubled
field. They can cultivate the practice of adding to specific enactments a section
specifying the extent to which the law is intended to apply to cases involving
foreign factors ....

These would not be choice-of-law rules, in the sense of

universals assigning "jurisdiction" to the only competent state. They would simply
be exercises of the lawmaking power, directed to local courts, providing aids of
statutory construction. Their great value would lie in the fact that they would
make explicit the policy expressed in the statute, and the mode of application that
will promote that policy .... If legislatures were to state their policies explicitly,

in such a way as to reveal the significant factors that should bring those policies
into play, the remaining task of the courts-to apply the law so as to effectuate
that policy where no constitutional barrier is presented, and to avoid applying it
needlessly to the impairment of interests of other states-would be a comparatively simple one.

Id. at 86-87.
52. Id.
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contrary to my position, legislatures do controlthe determination of state
interests after all.
But Currie was talking about legislative specifications of policy, not
of interests. In my view, he meant the sort of specification that Justice
Proctor supplied for the New Jersey law governing a host's liability to a
guest: that the law should be applicable whenever a New Jersey host
negligently injures a New Jersey guest.5" The New Jersey legislature,
had it accepted Currie's invitation, might have made that specification
itself. Had it done so, as Currie observed, "the remaining task of the
courts-to apply the law so as to effectuate that policy where no
constitutional barrier is presented, and to avoid applying it needlessly
to the impairment of interests of other states-would be a comparatively
simple one."54 Brilmayer says that "[tihe end result of this passage is
not clear."55 If so, it is because she does not draw a distinction between
a territorial directive and an elaboration of domestic policy. She reads
the passage as calling for a "decision about which geographical
connecting factors ought to matter."" Currie meant, rather, a specification of the breadth of the legislative policy. Such specifications are not
directions concerning territorial application. They are, instead, to use
Currie's words, "aids of statutory construction." 7 .Had the New Jersey
legislature specified that it intended to impose a duty of ordinary care
on New Jersey hosts wherever the host and guest travelled 'together,
Justice Proctor would have been spared the necessity of inferring that
purpose in Pfau.
Brilmayer betrays her confusion when she observes that Currie "does
not use the word 'interest' in the above passage, leading to the possibility that he might have been in favor of statutory enactments even though
they do not necessarily give rise to' interests."58 Currie's statutory
specifications were neither choice of law rules nor interests. Instead,
they were elaborations of domestic policy. Thus, in Pfau, even if the
New Jersey legislature, rather than the New Jersey Supreme Court, had
indicated that its policy of imposing a duty of care on hosts should be
observed regardless of where the injury to the guest occurred, that
indication would not have created a New Jersey interest. The interest
flows from the facts of the case-defendant's New Jersey domicle-and
that interest must still be determined objectively by the court.

53. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 136.

54. B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 171 (quoted in Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 87, and
reproduced in note 51).

55. Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 87.
56. Id.
57. B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 171.

58. Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 87.
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Brilmayer appears to grasp that this might be so, for she observes that
"[plerhaps the quoted language is totally separate from the question of
whether an interest exists."59 But she then goes on to question that
observation by referring to my analysis of the "appropriate relationships"
that give rise to interests. 6' She says:
But the fact that Kay refers to the ascertainment of legitimate
interests as "clearly" the same as "the constitutional standards that
control the state's capacity to apply its own law" suggests otherwise.
Under Kay's formulation, the ability of a State to apply its own law
would depend on whether the State had a legitimate interest in the
sense that concerns her, a legitimate interest that arises out of the
existence of an "appropriate" connection between the dispute and the
State. If Currie meant that State legislatures should integrate explicit
choice of law provisions into their statutes, and did not think that
doing so gave rise to an interest, then if Kay is correct, he was advising
State legislatures to enact unconstitutional statutes."'
The hypotheses on which this conclusion is based are not supported by
the passages quoted either from my work or from that of Currie. The
misstatement of Currie's position is the most glaring: Brilmayer's
speculation, quoted above, that Currie might have meant that state
legislatures should integrate explicit choice of law provisions into their
statutes follows immediately after her quotation from the passage in
which Currie says of the statutory specifications under discussion,
"These would not be choice-of-law rules, in the sense of universals
assigning 'jurisdiction' to the only competent state."6 2
The point becomes even clearer when one consults Currie's example
of what he meant by such a statutory specification, which Brilmayer
omits from the passage as she quoted it:
Thus, California might reasonably specify that its law on the survival
of personal injury actions is intended to apply to all cases in which the
injured person is a resident of California, and also to all cases in which
the injured person, though a nonresident, is present in California at
the time of the injury. The Arizona legislature, if such should be its
will, could specify that its law abating such actions is intended to apply
to all cases in which the action is brought against a local executor or

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Kay, supra note 6, at 53-54.
Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 87-88.
B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 171 (quoted in Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 87).
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administrator, or to all cases in which the deceased tort-feasor was
domiciled there, or both.'
These specifications indicate the legislature's thoughts on the persons
to whom the law it has enacted should be applied, not its decision as to
territorial connecting factors. As Currie noted, in the passage that
Brilmayer does quote, "[tihey would simply be exercises of the lawmaking power, directed to local courts, providing aids of statutory construction."' 4 Armed with these aids, the comparatively simple, but vitally
important, judicial task remaining is "to apply the law so as to effectuate
that policy where no constitutional barrier is presented, and to avoid
applying it needlessly to the impairment of interests of other states. "65
This judicial task is the same one that I identified in my Hague
Lectures, and the one Brilmayer refers to in the statement quoted above
and discusses more fully a few pages earlier.6 As applied to Pfau, the
New Jersey court would look to three conceptually distinct, but related
elements. First, it would ascertain what factual relationship exists
between the state and the transaction. In Pfau, the defendant host was
a New Jersey domicilliary who is being sued in the New Jersey courts.
Second, the court would examine that factual relationship in light of the
legislative policy to determine whether the factual relationship
implicates the policy. In Pfau, the "specification" made earlier by the
New Jersey court in Cohen indicates that the policy of imposing a duty
on hosts will be advanced by applying it to a New Jersey host.67 Third,
the relationship must be an "appropriate" one so that it will survive

63. Id. Currie's example is based on Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953), a
case involving a collision in Arizona between two cars registered in California. The
California tortfeasor died before suit was filed against him in California by the injured
California plaintiff, Arizona, but not California, abated tort actions that were not
commenced prior to the tortfeasor's death. Mr. Justice Traynor, writing for the California
court, applied California law to permit the suit to proceed against the tortfeasor's estate.
Id. at 946. 949.
64. B. CURRIE. supra note 46, at 171 (quoted in Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 87).
65. Id. at 172.
66. Kay, supra note 6, at 53-54.
[Wihether a state has an "interest" in Currie's sense depends on circumstances
beyond the state's control. Three elements are necessary to produce an interest:
first, a factual relationship must exist between the state and the transaction, the
parties, or the litigation; second, the factual relationship must implicate the
governmental policy; and third, the relationship must be an "appropriate" one. It
seems clear that an "appropriate" relationship means the same thing in the
interstate context as a "legitimate" governmental interest: both terms ultimately
refer to constitutional standards that control the state's capacity to apply its own
law.
Id. (quoted in Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 84-85).
67. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 131 (citing Cohen, 176 A.2d 483).
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constitutional scrutiny of the state's decision to apply its own law. In
Pfau, the state's application of its law to its domicilliary being sued in
its courts would survive the rather minimal constitutional limits
imposed by the United States Supreme Court's current interpretation of
the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. 68
Brilmayer objects, however, that "[ilt has not yet been explained what
makes some factors 'appropriate' and others 'inappropriate."' 69 Yet the
constitutional limits on the power of a state to apply its own law, though
not free of doubt, are at least relatively well established. In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,7" the Supreme Court held that Kansas, the
forum state, could not apply its own law given its lack of interest in
claims unrelated to the state, in a case where other states with
competing laws did have related claims. 7 In Shutts, the only relationship between Kansas and the transaction as to some of the claims was
its status as the forum.72 That factor was an inappropriate basis for
the application of Kansas law, given the existence of other states with
73
appropriate relationships to these claims and with conflicting laws.
The fact that application of a state's domestic law must be tested against
constitutional standards does not mean, as Brilmayer claims, that a
court's satisfaction of that standard through a search for an appropriate
relationship between the state and the dispute before it renders the
legislative specifications Currie invited unconstitutional. Indeed, as
Currie observed in the quoted passage, it is this very task-"to apply the
law so as to effectuate the policy where no constitutional barrier is
presented" 7 4-that remains with the courts after the legislature has
specified the scope of its policy.
As to what factors are "inappropriate," consider what might have
happened in a varient of Pfau in which both the host and guest had been
Iowa domicilliaries and the Iowa plaintiff had managed to serve the
Iowa defendant personally while both were temporarily present in New
Jersey. Does anyone doubt that, if New Jersey decided to hear the case
at all, application of New Jersey law would be inappropriate as well as
unconstitutional under the Shutts test? Using my three-factor test,
examination of the first factor shows that New Jersey's only factual

68. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,

449 U.S. 302 (1981).
69.
70.
71.
72.

Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 86.
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 823.

73. Id.
74. B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 171.
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relationship to the transaction is its designation as forum by virtue of
having obtained personal jurisdiction over the parties. Although an
expansive analysis of the 'second factor might yield the conclusion that
the policy of New Jersey law will be furthered by its application to all
cases filed in the New Jersey courts, even a cursory reference to the
third factor would make clear that New Jersey's decision to apply its
own law would seriously infringe on the conflicting policy and interest
of Iowa and could not be sustained either under interest analysis or the
Constitution.
Brilmayer's analysis does not support her claim that Currie's
invitation to state legislatures to specify the scope of their domestic
policies is in conflict with my statement that state legislatures cannot
enact interests. Currie was inviting legislatures to be more precise in
enunciating policies; my point that those enunciations are not interests
is not a refusal to honor legislative actions. Legislatures provide the
basis for a court's identification of interests by their choice of domestic
policies. Legislatures enact domestic *laws and are encouraged to
indicate the extent to which they, would like to have the policies
underlying those laws applied to cases that do not present purely
domestic situations. When they do so, they simplify the task of courts
faced with conflict of laws problems. But their specifications are not a
substitute for the objective identification of interests, nor do they control
the judicial duty to measure domestic law against constitutional
limitations. Moreover, courts fulfilling those duties by following Currie's
approach to choice 'of law do so in harmony with, not in defiance of,
legislative will.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF JURISDICTION-SELECTING CHOICE OF LAw
RULES TO INTEREST ANALYSIS

Pfau and Reich had another feature in common. In both cases,
although the state of plaintiff's domicile shared the forum's domestic tort
policies of full recovery, neither had adopted a modern approach to
choice of law. Both Connecticut and Ohio followed the vested rights
approach to conflict of laws problems and used traditional jurisdictionselecting choice of law rules that identified the law of the place of wrong
as the governing law. Had plaintiffs brought suit in their home states,
assuming they could have obtained jurisdiction over defendants there,
they might have lost. If Chief Justice Traynor was aware of this
circumstance, he appears not to have thought it significant: he referred
to Ohio's constitutional provision prohibiting limitation of damages for
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wrongful death,75 but he did not mention that Ohio's use of the lex loci
delicti in torts conflicts cases might suggest that an Ohio forum would
have applied Missouri law. This omission drew criticism from Professor
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, who pointed out that if Ohio would have applied
Missouri law to limit plaintiff's recovery, "it was hardly justifiable for
the Reich court to speak of an Ohio interest 'in affording full recovery.' "" Replying to Ehrenzweig, I observed:
I am not impressed by the consideration that Ohio, as a forum,
might have applied the law of Missouri to limit plaintiff's recovery ....
The mere fact that Ohio might mistakenly fail to recognize her own
legitimate interests need not prevent California from recognizing her
interests on her behalf, at least when to do so will not defeat any
opposing interest of Missouri.77
The parties in Pfau, by contrast, made the Connecticut choice of law
rule a central part of their argument, contending that if New Jersey
applied Connecticut's substantive law, the court should apply its choice
of law rule as well, a contention that Justice Proctor took to mean that
"Connecticut's interest in its domiciliaries is identified not only by its
substantive law, but by its choice-of-law rule.""8 He went on to reject
this contention on two grounds: First, he was not persuaded that a
Connecticut court actually would apply Iowa law denying recovery rather
than invoking one of the "traditional escape devices" to avoid that "harsh
result." 9 Second, and more importantly for this discussion, however,
Justice Proctor refused to consult the Connecticut choice of law rule on
the ground that it "does not identify that state's interest in the
matter,"8 0 going on to explain that "[IWex loci delicti was born in an
effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does not relate to a
state's81 interest in having its law applied to given issues in a tort
case."
In rejecting the relevance of traditional jurisdiction-selecting choice of
law rules to the determination of a state's interest in applying the
policies underlying its domestic law, Justice Proctor was in conformity
with Currie's views on the matter. Early on, Currie noted "with some

75. Reich, 432 P.2d at 729 n.2.
76. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 570, 578

(1968).
77.
78.
79.
80.

Kay, supra note 36, at 589 n.31.
Pfau, 263 A.2d at 136.
Id. at 136 n.4.
Id. at 137.

81. Id.
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trepidation" that courts following his approach could dispense with "the
problem of the renvoi" because
(floreign law would be applied only when the court has determined that
the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the application of its law
and policy to the case at bar and that the forum has none. Hence,
there can be no question of applying anything other than the internal
law of the foreign state."2
This statement, however, does not meet the question posed both by
Ehrenzweig and the Pfau defendants. That question is why a forum
court, seeking to determine the interest of another state in the application of its domestic law, should ignore what appears to be a 'highly
pertinent datum: the decision by that state in the multistate context not
to apply its own law. The answer suggested by both questioners is that
the forum should not ignore this datum, but rather should conclude that
the other state has no interest in applying its law. Thus, they; would
argue, Chief Justice Traynor should have applied Missouri law to defeat
plaintiff's recovery, and Justice Proctor should have done the same with
Iowa law. 3
This argument appears plausible, and it has been endorsed both by
Brilmayer s4 and by my co-author, Professor Larry Kramer, in his
valuable analysis of the renvoi problem.8" Nevertheless, I believe that
the argument is mistaken, for it fails to keep separate two inquiries that
occur at different points in the analysis and deal with two quite different
issues: first, the identification of a state's interest in applying its
domestic law, and second, if such an interest has been identified, the
subsequent determination of whether the state chooses to assert its
domestic interest in the multistate context. As I have indicated earlier,
I believe that the first of these inquiries is objective.. The second,

82. B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 184. The quoted passage is taken from Currie's
original statement of his methodology, published in 1959. He subsequently modified his
approach in a 1963 article to include a new step: the "moderate and restrained
reinterpretation" of the potentially conflicting interests of two or more states. See Kay,
supra note 6, at 68-73. I will point out the significance of this modification for the
relevance of choice of law rules below. See infra text at notes 98-102.
83. The same result does not necessarily follow, for as we have seen, the New Jersey
court, unlike the California court, found that it had an interest in applying forum law to
enforce a duty of care imposed on New Jersey defendants. Under those circumstances,
New Jersey could simply have applied its own law without reference either to Connecticut's
domestic law or to her choice of law rule. See supra text at notes 40-42.
84. Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 560-61; see also LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS
105-09 (2d ed. 1995).
. 85. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1003-12 (1991).
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however, is determined by the state's approach to choice of law, and is
thus within the state's control.
Kramer has rejected both the reasoning on which I argued that Chief
Justice Traynor was right to ignore the Ohio choice of law rule in Reich,
and my conclusion that interests, unlike policies, are defined objectively."6 Kramer's rejection of these points is based on what he terms the
interpretative function of a choice of law rule:
A state's approach to choice of law by definition establishes the state's
rules of interpretation for questions of extraterritorial scope. This is
true even if the approach is not self-consciously adopted with this
thought in mind, for the very function of choice-of-law rules is to define
the applicability of the state's substantive laws in multistate cases. A
state may, for example, reject Currie's notion that the object of choice
of law is to implement domestic policies, adhering instead to the First
Restatement on the ground that it furthers uniformity and predictability. Misguided or not, by this decision the state chooses to circumscribe
the applicability of its laws according to these rules. The rules thus
define the states "interests" in the only sense in which that concept is
meaningful, and they should be respected by courts in other states.
Given this conclusion, both explanations offered by interest analysts
for ignoring foreign choice-of-law rules must be rejected. The first
explanation-that interests are defined objectively-is inconsistent
with the premise that choice of law is a process of interpreting the
relevant laws. In interpreting another state's laws, the court is asking
whether that state has conferred a right, not whether the forum or an
interest analyst thinks it should."7
Kramer describes not "a process of interpreting the relevant laws," but
a rule-based barrier that, if respected by other courts, would prevent
such a process of interpretation. A court following interest analysis does
not consult foreign law initially to discover "the applicability of the
state's substantive laws in multistate cases." On the contrary, a court
seeks to learn only the policies underlying the other state's domestic
laws and whether those policies would be advanced by their application
to the facts of the case at hand. The overriding point of Currie's method
was that courts should begin their analysis of a conflicts problem with
an examination of the domestic policies of the laws asserted to be in
conflict and of the respective interests of the states in furthering those
policies. Nothing in any of his extensive writings suggests that he

86. Id. at 1003 n,81. He added that "Kay may have reached the correct outcome in this
case, but I offer a quite different explanation for why the court can ignore another state's
rule." Id.
87. Id. at 1011 (emphasis in original).
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thought traditional choice of law rules could impart any information
whatsoever on that initial inquiry. Justice Proctor's reasoning follows
this methodology: he aptly observed that Connecticut's decision to apply
the law of the place of injury has nothing to say about "its interest in
having its law applied to given issues in a tort case.""8
Brilmayer and Kramer argue that a court following this procedure
necessarily asserts its own view of what the other state's interests
should be, thus ignoring true legislative intent. But this argument
confuses the two different inquiries described above. When performing
the initial inquiry, the court is concerned with discovering the only
datum required for it to determine whether the policies of the two laws
are in conflict. The court does not distort the domestic policy of the
other state by asking only the questions that are made relevant by its
own approach to determining choice of law problems. States are free to
choose different approaches to choice of law, and a decision to reject the
traditional approach in favor of any of the modern, policy-oriented
approaches (including interest analysis) entails a rejection of the concept
that the place to begin the analysis is by identifying the jurisdiction
whose law should be applied without any inquiry into the substantive
policies involved. Kramer's observation that a state following the First
Restatement uses a different approach to choice of law than that of a
state following interest analysis is correct, but irrelevant.
Thus, Kramer's conclusion that choice of law rules "define the state's
'interests' in the only sense in which that concept is meaningful,"8 9
proves too much. His position would permit the choice of law rules of
every state following the First Restatement to prevent states following
other approaches from inquiring into the policies and interests of those
states, making any policy-oriented approach unworkable. Moreover, by
lumping together the two separate inquiries described above, Kramer's
position goes far beyond what is necessary for a forum court to respect
the other state's right to follow its own conflicts doctrine. The fact that
a Connecticut forum might choose not to assert its domestic interest in
a multistate case does not mean that its (objectively identified) domestic
interest does not exist or that it is somehow improper for a New Jersey
court to recognize that it exists. Connecticut's decision to adopt the First
Restatement is neither an interpretation of the policies underlying the
Connecticut guest statute nor a declaration of the state's domestic
interests in achieving those policies. On the contrary, it is a rather
direct statement that Connecticut chooses not to advance its domestic

88. Pfau, 263 A.2d at 137.
89. Kramer, supra note 85, at 1011.
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interests in the multistate setting, presumably because it has chosen to
seek other goals, such as the hope of achieving uniformity, instead.
This conclusion would not have surprised Currie. The centerpiece of
his attack on the FirstRestatement was his demonstration that a court
following its precepts faithfully would reach arbitrary and irrational
results contrary to the interests of one or both of two states concerned
with contract 9° or tort actions.91 His proposal was to counsel courts
to give up the system that produced such indefensible results, and
instead, to adopt a strategy of rational self-interest. A state that rejects
that advice cannot, by definition, be said to be defining its interests in
Currie's terms.
Moreover, Kramer himself expressly recognizes that domestic interests
are defined objectively. 2 In presenting his own description of how
courts should analyze choice of law problems, he states that "[a] conflict
of laws exists only when the factual contacts are distributed in such a
way that more than one state wants to regulate."93 He then goes on to
say:
[L]awmakers seldom give any clear indication about extraterritorial
applications. The first step in the choice-of-law process thus calls for
the court to fill this gap by identifying which contact or contacts must
be located in a state for that state's law to apply. As explained above,
courts accomplish this task by ascertaining the law's purpose in
domestic cases and presuming that it applies only when a contact
triggering that purpose is located in the state. When this condition is
satisfied, interest analysts say the state is "interested." I prefer to say
that the state's law is "prima facie applicable" in order to avoid some
of the baggage associated with the term interest, and to emphasize that
a state whose law is applicable in this sense may still choose not to
enforce that law because another state's law is similarly applicable. 94
Regardless of terminology, Kramer here recognizes the distinction I
proposed above between identifying a state's domestic interests
objectively and, only thereafter, determining whether the state wishes
to assert that interest. In Part IV of his paper, Kramer goes on to draw
a distinction between choice of law rules that define the scope of foreign
law (which he asserts should be recognized as an interpretation of the
state's positive law) and choice of law rules that seek to resolve true
conflicts (which he contends must win the day, if at all, on the merits of

90. B.CURRIE, supra note 46, at 81-98.
91. Id. at 141-63.

92. Kramer, supra note 85, at 1011.
93. Id. at 1013.
94. Id. at 1014.
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the proposed resolution).9" He concedes that applying this distinction
to the First Restatement's choice of law rules is difficult, precisely
because that approach proceeds without taking account of domestic
policies and interests. In the context of Reich, where, if Ohio's lex loci
delicti rule is to be read as removing Ohio's tort law from consideration,
none of the three states having contacts with the occurrence has. an
interest in applying its law, a court following interest analysis would
probably treat the matter as an "unprovided-for" case"6 and apply
forum law if the case could be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds-an unlikely result when the defendant is domiciled in the
forum state. Kramer, however, has argued forcefully that the unprovided-for case does not exist.9 7 If his view that the First Restatement's
choice of law rules are to be read as declarations of state interest is
accepted, the incidence of ostensible unprovided-for cases may be
multiplied.
In his first article announcing interest analysis, Currie contrasted the
attitude of a state following the FirstRestatement with that which might
be followed by "a quite selfish state, concerned only with promoting its.
own interests; a state, if you please, blind to consequences, and
interested in short-run 'gains.'"98 By the time he was ready to announce his methodology about a year later, Currie defended his approach
against the charge that his suggested analysis implied "the ruthless
pursuit of self-interest by the states" by pointing to three restraining
factors: constitutional constraints on choice of law, altruistic considerations, and the use of "restraint and enlightenment in the determination
of what state policy is and where state interests lie."" Several' years
later, he modified his approach by counseling a forum, faced with the
recognition that both the forum and another state had competing policies
and interests, to engage in a "moderate and restrained" interpretation
of the policy and'of the circumstances in which it must be applied to
effectuate the forum's purpose. 0 0 As I have pointed out elsewhere,' °
this development indicated Currie's willingness to take account of the
competing policies and interests of other states in an effort to avoid the
impasse that a true conflict of laws determination entailed, with the

95. Id. at 1028-29.
96. B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 152-56. An "unprovided-for" case is one in which no
state has an interest in applying its own law.
97. Larry Kramer, The Myth ofthe "Unprovided-For"Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
98. B. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 89.
99. Id. at 185-86.
100. Brainerd Currie, The DisinterestedThird State, 28 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 754,
757 (1963).
101. Kay, supra note 6, at 68-73.
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forum applying its own law. I agree with Kramer that the choice of law
decisions by courts following interest analysis and other "two step"
policy-oriented approaches to choice of law are valuable sources of
interpretation in those circumstances. 2 They are valuable, however,
not because they define the geographic limits of the state's interests, but
because they provide important information about the very issue that
the forum must decide: Whether the other state, faced with an apparent
true conflict after a full consideration of the competing policies and
interests, would choose to assert its domestic interest.
The territorial, jurisdiction-selecting choice of law rules used by the
First Restatement provide no such information. When Currie first
announced his approach in 1958, it would have been simply wrong to
attribute to a state following lex loci delicti any thought that a policyoriented analysis was even possible, let alone a decision to reject such an
analysis because the state sought thereby to advance its own multistate
interests. Under those circumstances, my willingness in 1968 to permit
California to recognize Ohio's domestic interests on her behalf still seems
justified. 3
Today, things are different. States have had nearly forty years to
consider whether they should abandon the traditional approach to choice
of law in favor of a modern, policy-oriented approach, and most of them
have made informed selections. When I first tallied the states following
different approaches in 1983, sixteen states and the District of Columbia
still adhered to the traditional vested rights approach embodied in the
FirstRestatement; three others had rejected that approach only in part;
and in two other states, no modern cases could be found."rx Fourteen
years later, when Professor William M. Richman and Mr. David Riley
presented their updated results to the Conflict of Laws Section at the
American Association of Law Schools' meeting in January 1997, sixteen
states, (including only twelve of my original sixteen) still followed that

102. Kramer, supra note 85, at 1028-38.
103. Kay, supra note 36, at 594.
104. Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER
L. REV.521, 582 (1983).
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approach.'0 5 These states have relinquished, for the time being, the
opportunity to adopt a modern analysis.
Under these circumstances, a court following interest analysis should
still disregard the other state's traditional choice of law rule as
irrelevant to its initial inquiry into the policies and interests underlying
that state's domestic law. In approaching the second inquiry, however,
the court should take account of the other state's choice of law rule. If
that state would choose not to further its domestic interests in the
interstate setting, the forum must decide what its own approach to
choice of law requires. It should recognize that the situation poses a
conflict of conflict of laws rules. If that conflict is treated like a true
conflict of domestic interests under governmental interest analysis, each
state, as forum, would presumably follow its own approach. If I
understand Kramer's suggestion correctly, he would permit a forum
following a policy-oriented analysis to apply its own choice of law
approach rather than that of the other state's traditional rule when
those approaches would produce a different outcome at the level of the
second inquiry,0 s at least if the forum "remains convinced that this
rule will better maximize both states' interests in the long run.""7 On

105. William M. Richman & David Riley, The Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws
on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practiceon Traditional
Courts, U. TOLEDO L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). In Table II, Richman and Riley put my
count of states following the traditional approach at twenty-eight states and the District
of Columbia. They include in their count seven states that I listed as following other
approaches, either a combination of two modern approaches or the Restatement Second.
Even with this correction, however, the decline in the number of states following the
traditional approach is striking. Moreover, no state that I showed as having abandoned
the traditional approach has reversed its decision to return to the vested rights doctrine.
The direction of the trend in choice of law seems clear.
106. Kramer, supra note 85, at 1039-40.
Thus, suppose Michigan [policy approach] law is prima facie applicable: finding
Illinois [traditional approach] law inapplicable at the first step means there is no
conflict, and Michigan will apply its own law; finding Illinois law inapplicable at
the second step, in contrast, means there is a conflict, and Michigan will follow its
own policy-selecting rule, which may direct it to apply Illinois law even though
Illinois would not do so.
Id. at 1040.
107. Id. at 1043. I take it that in this passage, Kramer uses the term "states' interests"
to refer both to domestic interests and interstate, or conflicts, interests. I also take it that
it is on the basis of this analysis that he deemed my original suggestion that California
could properly apply Ohio's domestic law as the rule of decision in Reich to be correct, but
for the wrong reason. If I am correct in this assumption, it does not seem to me that our
final analyses are so far apart. Indeed, Kramer hypothesizes a case in which Illinois's
traditional rule points to Michigan law, but Michigan's law "is not even prima facie
applicable," i.e., in Currie's terms, Michigan has no interest in having its law applied.
Kramer explains: "To the extent that Illinois's one-step approach presumes that both
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that view, I continue to think that Chief Justice Traynor correctly used
California's approach to choice of law by disregarding Ohio's choice of
law rule in Reich.
V.

CONCLUSION

Brilmayer's Hague Lectures provide a convenient and valuable
summary of her sustained critique of interest analysis. She deserves
much credit for having forced those of us who continue to work within
the framework Currie provided to re-examine our assumptions and to
defend our methods. As I have tried to show in this Article, however,
her continued charge that interest analysis was based on a false claim
of fidelity to legislative intent that does not hold up under close scrutiny
cannot itself be sustained. In particular, her rejection of my distinction
between a state's subjective domestic policies and its objective domestic
interests does not advance her argument that interest analysts use
choice of law logic to substitute their own views for legislative "intent."
Instead, her statement that "[tihe more clearly.that modern theorists
attempt to differentiate the 'policy' determination from the 'interest'
determination (in order to explain why legislative preference matters for
the first and not the second) the more evident it becomes that the second
is really a standard question of choice of law,"' falsely equates the
traditional rule-based reliance on geographical connecting factors with
the fact-sensitive, objective, case-by-case determination of whether an
appropriate basis exists for policy implementation.
Similarly, my defense of the refusal of a forum using interest analysis
to consult another state's traditional choice of law rules does not ignore
either the other state's legislative purpose underlying its domestic law
or its domestic interest in achieving that purpose. On the contrary, it
is the other state's decision to use the traditional approach that results
in the subordination of that state's domestic interests to its multistate
goals. The fact that Currie thought this decision a bad idea does not

states confer rights in this case, it simply misinterprets Michigan law." Id. at 1043 n.201.
But Illinois has not "interpreted" Michigan law at all; it has simply decided that Michigan's
geographical connecting factor has made its law applicable. For Kramer to conclude that
this is a "misinterpretation" of Michigan law is to recognize that it is possible to identify
objectively that Michigan law is "prima facie applicable," which I take to mean that
Michigan has an interest in having its law applied. If Illinois's misinterpretation of
Michigan law is open to objective correction, so might be Illinois's misinterpretation of its
own domestic interests.
108. Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 89.
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mean that, contrary to Brilmayer's characterization, interest analysis is
a "well-intentioned misrepresentation."1"'

109.

Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 392.

